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Summary  findings
Minimizing  costs  is often  cited  as essential  for  optimizing  outweighed  by increases  in efficiency  when  the  locus of
service  delivery.  Roads  are  the oldest,  most  important  roadwork  is closer  to the people.
infrastructure  services  provided  bv governments.  They  T'he advantages  or limitations  of decentralization  are
require  construction,  rehabilitation,  maintenance,  and  functioti-specific:
administration  (planning,  selection,  and  management).  *  Maintenance  functions  are best  provided  locally.  If
Various  institutional  arrangements-  includinig the  both  resource  and  preference  costs  are considered,  local
structure  of decentralization  --  affect  the degree  to  government  should  have  more  than  40  but  less than  70
which  costs can  be minimized.  perceint of  fiscal responsibility.  If only  resource  cost
Drawing  on analyses  of experiences  with decentralized  efficiencies  are considered,  there  should  be complete
road  provision  in eight  countries,  a longitudinal  analysis  decentralization.
(over  25 years) of change  in the  Republic  of  Korea,  and  l  To  minimize  resource  costs,  construction  should  be
vertical  and  horizontal  analysis  across  states  and local  eit her completely  centralized  or  completely
governments  in Germany,  Humplick  and  Moini-Araghi  decentralized.  The  efficiency  of construction  is more
found  that  the  impact  of decentralization  varies  sensitivc  to the  degree  of competition  in award  contracts
depending  on which  aspect  one  is considering:  the  than  to the degree  of decentralization.
efficiency  of producing  road  services  or the  impact  on  *  Administrative  activities  are more  efficiently
road  users.  provided  by local units  similar  to local  maintenance
Resource  costs  - the  cost  of providing  roads  ($Ikm)  units.  At early  stages of decentralization,  it is more  costly
-are  concave,  increasing  first  and decreasing  at later  to administer  a growing  number  of  road  agents,  making
stages of  decentralization.  Preference  costs --  the  costs to  the  )primal  level more  than  50 percent  but  less than  80
road  users  as a result  of bad  roads  --  are downward  percent  local  fiscal responsibility.
sloping,  suggesting  that  road  conditions  improve  Es  Exceptions  to these  results  include  the United  States,
decentralization  advances.  whcre  nearly  all road  functions  are decentralized  and
In short,  decentralization  entails  initial  costs,  mostlv  as  )pe-at(  efficiently.
losses in economies  of scale.  But those  losses can  br
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countries.1. Introduction
Determinants  of Optimal  Decentralization
Cost minimization is often quoted as a necessary condition for optimization of
service delivery. The costs associated with service delivery can be divided into two
components based on the distinction  between resource costs and social or preference costs.
Resource costs are activity specific resource requirements for production and provision of
services. They include all the direct and indirect inputs required for delivering services.
Preference costs entail the service quality or conditions affecting the demand for services
by  beneficiaries. Roads are one of the oldest and most important infrastructure services
provided by governments. There are various activities required for provision of road
services. These range from construction, rehabilitation and maintenance  to administrative
activities, the latter encompasses all planning, selection and management activities. The
resource requirements for each activity result in respective costs. Preference costs are
associated with the road users, whose perception of reliability of road services and their
quality is an important determinant of demand for road services and ultimately their optimal
supply.
Empirical evidence shows that various institutional arrangements, mainly the
structure of decentralization,  affects the degree to which the two cost categories are
minimized.  There are various forms and degrees of decentralization  that can be
distinguished. Decentralization can be fiscal, functional, or spatial.  Fiscal decentralization
involves the transfer of expenditure- and/or resource generation authorities to lower levels
of government.  As for functional decentralization,  Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) provide
a neat definition, distinguishing between ma or forms of functional decentralization,  mainly
devolution, deconcentration and delegation.  Decentralization  can also be spatial and relate
to the horizontal division of powers among various levels of government. In that case it
serves as a measure of the depth of decentralization. For example, in Germany the
horizontal allocation of responsibilities  to local governments varies from state to state with
some states allocating powers to some 1500 local governments, whereas, others have
transferred responsibilities to a much smaller number of local governments.
For the case of roads, we can also distinguish between three forms of decentralized
service provision, functional, fiscal and spatial decentralization.  Quite broadly, three main
responsibilities orfinctions--construction, maintenance and administrative  works--can be
distinguished where different levels of government are  fiscally responsible for appropriate
3Devolution  involves  the transfer  of functions  or decision-making  authority  to legally  incorporated  local
governments,  such  as states,  provinces  or municipalities.  Delegation  involves  the transfer  of functions  to
regional  or functional  development  authorities,  parastatal  organizations,  or special  project  implementation
units  that often  operate  free of central  government  regulations  and  act as an agent  of state  in  performing
prescribed  functions  with  the ultimate  responsibility  remaining  with  central  government.  Deconcentration
involves  the transfer  of functions  within  the central  government  hierarchy  through  the shifting  of workload
from  the central  government  to filed  offices,  and  the shifting  of responsibilities  to local,  administrative  units
that  are part of the central  government  structure.
2expenditure authority.  In other words, lower levels of government may be responsible for
spending on construction, maintenance and/or administrative  works. The distribution of
responsibility across functions is functional decentralization,  while the distribution across
expenditure and resource generation responsibilities  is fiscal decentralization. The number
of persons served by a given level of government or the number of governments by
economic output (GDP) is a measure of the spatial extent of decentralization.
The degree of decentralization is associated with the relative share that a unit of
government assumes in service provision. The extent to which service delivery is
decentralized or centralized in a given country can be related to three factors: a) the relative
importance attached to various societal and govermmental  objectives, mainly equity and
efficiency objectives; b) degree of mobility, and c) service characteristics. A country whose
overriding objective is equity and harmonization of living conditions will, for examnple,  be
more centralized than one where there is emphasis on resource efficiency objectives. The
degree of mobility also affects the extent to which service delivery is decentralized. The
less people move from one jurisdiction to another, the higher the reliance on central
government authorities for regulating service quantity and quality standards, for equity
reasons.  Other cases requiring a central government role is when increased degrees of
mobility result in increased inter-jurisdictional spillover effects.
Further, the structure of decentralization  varies with the specific characteristics of
the service.  For the case of roads, it is mainly the technical characteristics of roads and the
diversity of demand that determine the provision outcome. Construction services, for
example,  require heavy equipment and machinery and  lump-sum and large resource
allocations, whereas, maintenance operations are more labor-intensive and require in
general fewer resources but more periodically.  This implies that larger units of
government may be in a better position to finance construction services since they
possess economies of scale in production of large-scale projects.  For maintenance works,
recent empirical evidence has shown that there are gains to be made from decentralizing
maintenance activities (Humplick and Estache, 1995).
Diversity of demand is another factor affecting the degree of decentralization.
Demand varies depending on the role required from the service by service users.  For
example, a farmer who uses a road for moving his produce from one location to another
has a different expectation from the road than a local user who uses the road occasionally
to get access to other services. Demand also varies with the provisional structure,
regional and socio-economic characteristics of a jurisdiction, and the overall profile of the
government and its surrounding environment.
Objectives
This paper aims at investigating through a set of case studies, whether an optimal
structure for provision of roads exists. The analysis is based on a two-dimensional  provision
structure, mainly a combination of fiscal and functional forms and degrees of
decentralization.  The study is unique in its attempt to develop a conceptual framework for
3understanding both the influencing factors (institutional and economic) of the structure of
decentralization for the road sector and for evaluating empirically  the impact of
decentralization on road service delivery. The study is also interesting in that it makes a
distinction between the three types of road activities mentioned earlier and the desirability
of decentralizing their provision.
Outline of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the general and extended
theoretical frameworks of the study. Section three provides a framework for the analysis of
the optimal structure of road service provision.  Section four presents the data set that will
be used for the analysis. Section five studies the relationship between decentralization and
road service delivery. It discusses the impact of decentralization  on road performance for
various activities.  Further, it looks at the dynamics of decentralization  for eight countries
that have varying degrees of fiscal and functional decentralization  for road works. This
provides an understanding of the forces that derive decentralization and the potential
tradeoffs that governments can make to reach optimal road service levels. The sixth section
is a longitudinal analysis of the road provision experience of Korea. Korea has been
selected because of its rich experience with decentralization  in the road sector. Section
seven presents the findings from a case study conducted for Germany. The analysis in this
section is different in that it develops both vertical and horizontal measures of
decentralization. Finally, based on the analysis conducted in sections three to seven,




Governments have  complex  structures both  horizontally in  terms  of  numerous
agents and  vertically in terms of different levels of government.  In many developing
countries, the trend in recent years has been towards increasing decentralization in  the
direction of granting more authority to lower levels of government.  Most interestingly,
new  levels  of  government have  emerged  to  address  the difficulties  faced  by  central
governments.  The question of which level of government is the appropriate or desirable
provider  of  local  public  services  has  received  some  attention  in  the  literature  on
decentralization and local finance.  This section reviews that branch of the literature that
provides some useful insights into the determination of proper levels of government for
provision of local goods.
Public Finance Treatment of Decentralization
The  fiscal  federalism  literature  has  developed  very  useful  guidelines  for the
assignment of fiscal functions to various levels of government.  Musgrave in the Theory
4of Public Finance (1959) saw the heart of "Fiscal  Federalism" to be in the Allocation
Branch.  He argued that  it is in the tailoring of outputs  of local  public goods to  the
particular tastes  and  circumstances of  different jurisdictions  that  the  real  gains  from
decentralization are to be realized.  This  takes its  sharpest form in  the Tiebout  model
(1956) of local finance where individuals move and "shop" among jurisdictions offering
alternative levels of output of local public goods.  Oates, however, finds that the mobility
of consumers is by no means necessary for decentralized provision of local public goods.
Even in the  complete absence of mobility there will exist welfare gains from  varying
local  outputs  matched with  local tastes and  costs.  The tailoring of  outputs  to  local
circumstances will  produce higher levels of well-being than a  centralized decision to
provide some uniform level of outputs across all jurisdictions [See Oates (1972, p.35) on
the "Decentralization Theorem"].  Furthermore, such gains do not depend on the mobility
across jurisdictions or any other external effects.
Expanding on the "Decentralization Theorem", Oates (1972) sees the problem of
selecting the proper  level of decentralization for provision  of local public  goods as a
tradeoff  between  increased cost-savings  from joint  provision  by central government
versus  the  greater  welfare  from  more  responsive  levels  of  provision  by  local
governments.  In  his  model,  the  following  factors  are  important  determinants  of
centralized versus decentralized provision of a good: i) the technical character of the good
(it is  argued that the  central government possesses  economies of  scale in  large-scale
production and provision of certain goods and therefore is a better provider) and ii) the
diversity  in  individual  demands  for  the  good  (Oates,  1972:  45).  If  there  are  wide
differences  in  individual  preferences  for  the  public  good,  one  may  expect  large
differences in desired levels of provision among various areas. In such cases the potential
losses from centralized provision of the good are large, therefore, decentralized provision
is preferred.
While the models of fiscal federalism provide very useful conceptual guidelines
for the analysis of the problem of decentralization, they have been subject to lively debate
and  a  wide  range  of  proposals.  Tresh  (1981),  for  example,  argues  that  Oates
"Decentralization Theorem" is a theory of second-best because the central government is
forced to offer equal service levels to all people.  Others have argued that these models do
not  attempt  to  understand the  real  choices  that  drive  public  sector  and  institutional
decision making processes ( Biehl, 1994, Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).  No account is
taken of  costs to collective decision-making,  costs incurred while setting up new levels
of governments or the costs of management.
For  the  specific  case  of  roads, both  the technical  character  and  mobility  are
important determinants  of  supply.  The technical  character  affects the  production  of
roads, whereas, road user characteristics influence the provision outcome.  Road users can
be divided into two categories: the first include local users such as those who live in the
jurisdiction under consideration and who drive on roads and move goods and people from
one place to another.  They are the beneficiaries who demand that enough roads exist for
them to go everywhere they want within the jurisdiction and who would like roads to be
5reliable (no congestion or seasonal failures, wide lanes) and in good quality (primarily
paved), to minimize vehicle operating costs to make traveling more comfortable.  The
second group of users include transit users (national or international), whose economic
activity depends primarily on roads.  Generally, transit users depend on the road network
because they are moving inputs to the production plant or for taking products  to other
locations  in the domestic  or foreign markets.  Similar to  local users, transit users are
interested in the state of road services.
The two  kinds  of road  users differ in  the degree to  which  they express  their
demand for reliability and better road quality and in turn the level of government that is
most  responsive  to  their  demands.  Road  users'  responses  can  be  framed  using
Hirschman's  (1970)  exit,  voice  and  loyalty  concepts,  which  has  been  extended  by
Humplick (1991) to develop a general framework of analysis of demand for infrastructure
reliability.  Local users can generally be characterized by their tolerance of the existing
road conditions.  They are considered as captives or loyal to the road system  in their
jurisdiction.  As unreliablity increases, an increasing number of "captive users"  respond
by changing the nature of their activities.  For example, a firm that is dissatisfied with the
road system, may reduce its output, hire less labor or for the case of agricultural goods,
switch its production to  other products.  Local users can also substitute to  adopt more
costly alternatives such as purchasing a vehicle that responds better to prevailing levels of
quality.  Most often, these users express demand for better quality and reliability using
the voice  option in their jurisdictions;  voting is a powerful  instrument which  induces
local officials to respond to the demands of local users.
Transit  users,  on  the  other  hand,  are  characterized  by  their  high  degree  of
mobility.4 They  can  express their  preference  for  road  reliability  through  switching
activities,  participating  in  financing of  services or  more realistically  exiting  to  other
jurisdictions  and choosing alternative road services.  Due to their high mobility, transit
users can use relocation as a response to insufficient availability and adequacy of the road
system.  Transit users differ from local users in that they get their voice heard primarily
through the central government, whereas, local users get local government representatives
on their side to fulfill their demands.
Public Choice Theory and Decentralization
There is another branch of the literature in economics, embedded in the theory of
collective choice that provides some insight into this issue. Buchanan and Tullock (1962)
in Calculus of Consent, propose also a purely individualist definition of the public sector
and specify a double cost model to provide economic arguments for and against
decentralized  provision  (referred to as decision-making choices). Briefly, Buchanan and
4Zambia  is a good example of a transit jurisdiction.  The country is landlocked and people from
neighboring countries rely on  Zambian road services for transportation of goods and services.  Reliability
of Zambian road services is a critical factor affecting travel distance and timing of transport.  Zambian road
services have deteriorated enormously over the past decade, as a result, transit users have expressed
willingness to participate in financing of road betterment in that country.
6Tullock argue that whether decentralization is a preferred option for provision of a good
depends on the decision-making rule that is to prevail in collective choice-making.  For a
given activity,  the optimal decision-making rule consists of minimizing the present value
of expected resource costs ( these are costs involved in a decision-making process) and
external costs ( costs borne because of negative impact that others decisions have on an
individual) 5 (Buchanan and Tullock,  1962:75).
Since its development, the model has been extended for application to various
issues.  Biehl (1994), for example, applied an extended version of the double cost model
as a reference scheme to determination of optimal federal constitutional structures. In his
model, resource costs reflect efficiency criteria and external costs, which he redefines as
preference cost, reflect equity criteria.  The efficiency and equity objectives are seen as  a
tradeoff between resource costs compared with preference costs.  His analysis suggests
that neither complete centralization nor decentralization is an optimal solution for a
federal government structure. Of particular interest is his conclusion that differences
between various federal governments are determined by the relative importance attributed
to the two cost  objectives.  In unitary governments, resource costs dominate in the
decision of optimal degree of decentralization, whereas in highly decentralized
governments, preference costs dominate (Biehl, 1994). Although Biehl's approach is
very interesting, it is limited to a positive determination of optimal choice of rules for
fiscal federalism.
We find the Buchanan and Tullock cost approach most useful for studying
empirically the link between decentralization and efficacy with which the delivery of
services is performed.  The model can be readily adapted to address two issues: a) to
determine  desired levels of decentralization for delivery of road services and b) to
explain the factors that influence decentralization of roads delivery. The next section
presents the extended model with a specific application to roads.
The Double-Cost Approach to Decentralization of Road Service Provision
What follows is a presentation of the conceptual framework which has been
developed to analyze the links between decentralization and road service delivery.  First,
in considering the decentralization of roads, it is important to distinguish between various
types of decentralization.  Depending on the technology and type of resources used in
road works, different entities may be suited for the proper assignment of responsibilities.
In this respect,  three different types of decentralization may be distinguished: a)
decentralization of construction, which requires heavy equipment and machinery and
lumpsum and large resource allocations; b) decentralization of maintenance operations,
which may be labor based or equipment based but require in general fewer resources
periodically; and c) administrative decentralization which may serve as a measure of
5The  higher the number of those involved in decision-making, the more resources are  incurred and the
higher the decision-making costs.
7functional decentralization, as it concerns the organization and management of road
activities.
The types of decentralization defined borrow from concepts introduced in the
preceding sections. The impetus for the distinction between construction and
maintenance activities derives from Oates' (1972) definition of determinants of
centralized versus decentralized provision of a public good; mainly the technical
character of the good and the diversity in the individual preferences for the good. We
argue that construction activities are more technical in nature, requiring more
coordination and complex technology compared to maintenance. Hence, in the absence
of possibilities for private provision through competitive contracting out, economies of
scale savings may be realized if construction activities are centrally provided through
6 force account . This may be the reason why when service provision responsibilities are
decentralized, more contracting out to the private sector takes place, since these lower
levels of government are no longer able to realize economies of scale savings (see Lopez-
de-Silanes et al, 1995 for empirical evidence of this effect in the United States).
Individual preferences for varying levels of road condition, however, would
suggest potential savings in the forn  of lower costs to meet diversity of demands locally,
if decentralized provision of maintenance is followed. 7 For the case of administrative
activities, according to Buchanan and Tullock (1962), we expect that the resource costs
involved in decentralized decision-making processes would differ from those in more
centralized ones, and would be captured by the level of decentralization of administrative
functions.
In our paper, decentralization is defined in terms of how it relates to efficacy of
service delivery or perfornance.  As a measure of performance, we employ the extended
double cost approach.  We distinguish between two categories of costs: i) resource costs,
which are simply the costs of provision, administration, and management of roads (input
costs); and ii) preference costs, which are defined as costs incurred because of
insensitivity to local demand for road services. In line with economic theory, a suitable
social objective is to minimize total cost, which is the sum of preference costs and
resource costs. We recognize that differing levels of effort  can be applied to achieve the
same level of service delivery. 8
3. Framework of Analysis
6 When  construction  activities  are contracted  out to the private  sector,  there is still  the question  of
managing  the contracts  which  requires  capacity  and skills in procurement  and supervision  of civil works
which  may be better provided  centrally  in some  cases.
7Exceptions  include  for the case  of roads,  transit  users  and their demands  as well as externalities  (air
pollution,  damage,  etc.)
This  term is borrowed  from economics  of the firm, where  it is defined  as the degree  of attention  paid by a
manager  to reduce costs  or improve  performance  (see,  Laffont  and Tirole,  1993  p. 168).
8The relationship between decentralization and road performance can be
introduced  graphically.  Figure I shows how theory postulates that preference and
resource costs behave at different levels of decentralization.
Resource costs increase initially then decline at higher levels of decentralization
after a maximum point is reached.  Resource costs decline in  a non-linear fashion
(convex) but they decline at a decreasing rate or even increase after a certain level of
decentralization as economies of scale are lost.  We draw the main justification from
theory where it is argued that initially, the central government has important economies
of scale in the provision of roads and the initial fragmentation of central government may
result in loss of economies of scale (both administrative and technological) with a
consequent increase in cost of provision, administration, management of roads (Buchanan
and Tullock, 1962).  However, it seems reasonable to suppose that costs increase at a
decreasing rate or even start to decline as decentralization advances.  Two economic
arguments are put forward in support of this assumption: i) first, there may be important
diseconomies of scale resulting from inefficiencies inherent in big administrative units,
and ii) second, at higher levels of decentralization expenditure decisions may be tied
more closely to real resource costs 9 (Oates, 1972: 87, Hirsch, 1968: 495) and are hence
expected to be lower.  In this study, we explicitly test these assumptions for the case of
roads.
Preference costs in theory are expected to initially decrease with increasing
degrees of decentralization but increase after a certain optimal level of decentralization.
The decline in preference costs is non-linear (concave) but they decline at a decreasing
rate or increase after a certain level of decentralization as costs of collective decision-
making increase.  The expected decrease follows simply Musgrave's allocative efficiency
argument that decentralized units of government are closer to the people and can better
tailor the supply of roads to demand or  preferences of local residents.  The expected
increase follows Oates diversity argument that diversity in demand is best met through
decentralization.  Preferences of local- and transit users and the social value associated
with  the production of road quality can be defined in terms of the disutility of the
individual user, which we defined earlier as a preference cost.
Various levels of effort must be expended to minimize the gap between the two
costs.  In figure 1, at low levels of decentralization, high levels of effort are required to
reduce resource and preference costs.  But as the level of decentralization increases lower
levels of effort are expended as it becomes easier to align the objectives of the
beneficiaries to the implementation of required works.  We assume that the level of effort
(e) is unobserved and affected by non-quantifiables such as governmental, fiscal , and
institutional structures as well as societal objectives, all of which are specific to the
9This  is one  of the  arguments  that  Oates  (1972)  put forward  in favor  of decentralization  of  provision  of
public  goods.  Assuming  that  higher  degrees  of decentralization  imply  greater  autonomy  in expenditure
decision-making,  he argues,  local  governments  will  operate  more  efficiently  because  local  people  weigh
the  benefits  of a service  versus  its  costs.
9decision-making unit of analysis.  The above presented framework allows us to study
graphically the optiifial structure of provision for road services. The concepts developed
so far are applied in the next section.
4. Data Definition and Sources
The performance of roads is measured by the double cost concept introduced in
the previous sections.  Resource costs are defined in terms of unit cost of road works for
the activities of construction, maintenance, and administration measured in $ per km of
road.  These are essentially the input costs. A measure for preference costs is derived
using a framework developed by Ben-Akiva et al (1993) where condition of roads are
substituted as a proxy for users costs while utilizing roads of a given condition.
Decentralization is measured in terms of percentage local government contribution
towards road works.
The analysis relies on data from three main sources:
(a) cross-country and time series data on the unit costs of construction,
maintenance and administration, the percent roads in bad condition (as measured
by a proxy developed in the World Development Report of 1994 on Infrastructure
and Development), and the contribution of local governments to financing road
expenditures are obtained from the International Road Federation (IRF) statistics'°
for eight countries: Argentina (1982-86), Brazil (1982-93), Colombia (1982-90),
South Africa (1982-1989), Germany (1982-92), USA (1982-92), Philippines
II  ~~~~~~~~~12 (1982-86)  , and Indonesia (1982-86)  ;
'° The quality of data from the International Road Federation may suffer from problems of precision.
Many countries are unable to report with any precision the expenditures of  local govermnent units of roads
sicne their accounting systems do not record these data directly.  Therefore, most of the local government
data is based on estimates.  This is the main reason why we used a case study from Germany where we
conducted an original data collection and verified the results with supportive field work before using the
definitions of data we used in the final analysis.  The cases of Germany and Korea provide qualifying
evidence of the findings in the cross-country cases.
I  There may be an overestimate of the length of roads pertaining to a class called "baranguay" which may
overstate the importance of the class of roads at the subnational level in the case of the Philippines.  To
avoid the effect of classification on the results of the analysis, we use the overall network length at the
national level.  We expect that the incentives to over- or under-state the length of a particular category of
roads to vary by country and have used a country-specific dummy in a cross-country analysis presented in
a companion paper (see Humplick and Moini-Araghi, 1995).
12  The period 1982-86 for which data for Indonesia is available is a period when there was a priority given
to betterment and reconstruction of the existing main road network (arterial and collector).  That is,
substanntial improvement in quality with little extension, and substantial external funding.  In the same
period, the local (district) network was extended about 100% by inclusion of low standard roads which
would appear to reduce the average "quality".  The analysis conducted in this study is based on the total
netwrok of arterials, collectors, and low standard roads.  This could mean that the "preference costs" for
Indonesia are underestimated due to the "dilution" of the quality impacts.
10(b) the same data as in (a) above but focusing on the switches from centralized to
decentralized provision for the case of Korea from 1968-92 from the IRF source;
and
(c) data on roads disaggregated by activity at state and local government levels
obtained from seven German states (Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hessen, Bayern,
Niedersachsen, SchleswigHolstein, Nordrheinwestfalen, Saarland and
Rheinlandpfalz).  The data covers the period from 1980-1993. The state
government data was provided by the Deutsche Strassen Liga, a non-
governmental institute. 13 The local government data was collected from the
yearly Finanz Bericht and from interviews with road experts and officials in seven
states.
In addition, technical experts at the World Bank and in Germany were contacted
and interviewed to obtain additional information.
From the first data set we can investigate the relative impact of fiscal
decentralization across the three main road functions, giving an indication of the optimal
fiscal-functional allocation of responsibilities.  With the second data set, we can measure
the specific contribution of changes in degrees of decentralization across time, as we are
looking at one country which has changed the relative shares of local government
contributions to road expenditures.  The third data set allows us to conduct a two level
(horizontal and vertical) analysis of the impact of decentralization on road performance in
addition to the functional and fiscal analysis possible with the first and second data sets,
as well as a spatial analysis.  The measures of decentralization differ depending on the
level of analysis. At the horizontal level, the analysis takes the number of local
governments per capita GDP to measure spatial decentralization. At the vertical level,
decentralization is measured through the conventional variable percentage local
government spending versus central government expenditure. This analysis is limited to
measuring performance in terms of resource cost efficiency.  An analysis of performance
with respect to preference costs measured as is not possible since almost all roads are
paved and an inventory of road quality is only conducted in only two out of the seven
states.
5.  Country Case Studies
Empirical analysis of the optimal structure for decentralized provision of roads
suggests that the impact of fiscal decentralization on road performance is partially driven
by country specific factors (see a companion paper by Humplick and Moini-Araghi,
1995). But these country effects are generally fixed and unobservable.  In this paper, we
13The Deutsche  Strassenliga  brings  together  professionals  working  in different  areas  on roads.  Members
come  mainly  from  the private  sector  but the agency  is in close  cooperation  with  the state and federal
governments.  It promotes  the development  of roads  in Germany.
11employ the above introduced double-cost approach, adapted to capture the some of the
country-specificity's  as weights attached to resource and preference costs to provide a
discussion of the decentralization experience in the eight countries mentioned above.
These countries were selected because of their diverse decentralization experience in the
road sector. Road financing and delivery remains centralized in some of these countries,
whereas, in others, the functional and fiscal responsibility is decentralized.
Employing the estimated results from a cross-country panel data (taken from
Humplick and Moini-Araghi, 1995) we can get the average relationship between
decentralization and performance by road activity. Further, overlaying simply the country
specific data obtained from the cross country sample to the general graph allows us to
conduct a comparative study of proper levels of decentralization and performance for the
above mentioned countries.  We obtain two points for each country, one reflecting
resource costs and the other preference costs; each of the points represents country
specific levels of performance and decentralization. For each country, our inquiry looks
into the following issues: i) what is the level of decentralization and performance? ii)
what is the variation in performance, measured in terms of deviation of preference and
resource costs from the estimated value and what are the factors driving cross country
variations in observed levels of effort?  iii) for those countries where the level of variation
is high, what would be required to minimize resource and preference costs?
The expended level of effort varies from country to country depending on the
weight attached to preference and resource costs in that country. The weighting
procedure is driven by the objective to operate efficiently and to satisfy beneficiaries'
demand.  Moreover, the ability and willingness of govemments to fulfill the desired
standards and objectives that are demanded from the road network is a function of the
available resources, financial and institutional arrangements (whether expenditures are
financed from own-source revenues or from transfers, whether these are ear-marked or
not),  implementation capacity, as well as fiscal and political attitudes in a given country.
Actual levels of effort expended to maximize performance can thus be viewed as the
result of the above factors, which by no means are independent of each other.
Quite broadly, the interdependence of these factors can be shown through the
following examples.  In a country where road operations are fiscally decentralized and
there is no ear-marking of transfers, beneficiaries are not very clear about the opportunity
cost of production of road quality since spending is not tied to road works. There is
essentially only a loose link between quality of road services and its price.  The extent to
which preference and/or resource costs are minimized is dependent on local factors such
as the incentive structure provided to local govemments, degree of accountability and
involvement of beneficiaries, system of preferences and values, etc.  In fact, this is why
we see that decentralization is good for maintenance activities; when people jointly
determine their preference and resource costs. A country that is decentralized
functionally but not fiscally focuses primarily on minimization of preference costs.  The
beneficiaries are unaware and do not care about efficiency objectives. In contrast, a
country that is both functionally and fiscally decentralized and uses ear-marking of road
12charges, voters are highly aware of both resource and preference costs.  Fiscal
decentralization with ear-marking essentially means that taxes are benefit levies.
Increasing the quantity of production of road quality will result in a higher ear-marked tax
bill, making the opportunity cost of road services much clearer to the voter. The country
studies in the next section allow us to gain a better understanding of these issues.
Decentralization of Construction Expenditures
Figure 2(a) shows the relationship between decentralization of construction
expenditures and performance as obtained from the data set described in section 4.  On
the ordinate we have the countries in increasing degrees of decentralization of
construction in terms of percentage local government expenditure for road construction.
On the abscissa, we measure performance in terms of preference costs 14, defined as the
cost of roads in bad condition (roads not paved (million $/km)) and resource costs,
defined as unit cost of construction (expenditure on construction per km (million $/km)).
In figure 2(b) we present the same costs normalized by GNP per capita to adjust for
differences in technology. The determination of the proper level of decentralization for
construction of roads involves minimizing total cost of provision, expressed as the sum of
preference and resource costs for a given level of effort.
A first look at the graph shows that there are multiple-equilibria of
decentralization, as countries attain different levels of unit costs with increasing degrees
of decentralization. The countries selected in the case study in figures 2(a) and (b) fall
into four categories.  Brazil, the Philippines and Indonesia' 5 are all centralized with
regard to financing of  their road construction operations falling under the category [0-10]
percent decentralization;  Argentina, Colombia and Germany are more decentralized
with the central government and local governments sharing the fiscal responsibly for
construction activities. Moving further to the right, in South Africa, financing of
construction works is with local governments at [70-90] percent decentralization.
Finally, the USA is the most decentralized of all countries. Counties and townships and
state governments are almost 100 percent responsible for financing of construction
activities in their jurisdictions.
14 Quality of roads is used as a proxy for preference costs and quality is further interpreted as paved roads.
The expenditure data is separated into three activities: construction, maintenance and administration.  It
was assumed that, the three activities would contribute differently to preference costs and that the actual
effect is latent and hence unobservable. Furthermore, preference costs are assumed to be related to user
savings due to better quality roads.  Quality of roads has been transformed into costs using a latent variable
model specification where the indicator of quality is related to the three expenditure categories to get the
separate effect of the three activities on preference costs.  For more detail on the ability to relate indicators
of quality to user costs using a latent variable model specification see Ben-Akiva and Gopinath (1995)
The analysis was performed on a panel data set. The years for which data is available may not be totally
representative of the current situation in these countries.
13Table 1 shows a comparative view of performance by various cost categories, in
both normalized and non-normalized terms.  Indonesia stands out in its performance,
before normalization, in terms of very low unit costs of construction and low costs to
users as a result of improved road conditions (see also figure 2(a)).  However after
normalizing by GNP per capita to control for differences in technology (as in figure 2(b)),
we see that the best performer is the USA followed by Germany, Argentina, Brazil, and
South Africa, respectively.
At [0-10] percent decentralization, Brazil is quite a good performer with respect to
resource costs which are far below the rest of the countries in the case study.  This is not
the case with respect to preference costs which are higher than Indonesia and the
Philippines at the same level of decentralization. Such an outcome is a reflection of
Brazil's experience with restructuring of the construction sector throughout the 1980s.
For a very long time, financing of road construction was centralized with municipalities
being excluded from participating in the name of centralism; national coordination
objectives and economy-of-scale gains. The government introduced administrative and
fiscal decentralization measures in the mid 1980s to transfer responsibilities for
construction to municipalities and to increase resources and expenditures at the state and
municipality levels. But evidence shows that the provinces and municipalities have been
quite reluctant and slow at adjusting to their new roles due to their highly centralized
organization and lack of resources (World Bank, 1993). The high preference costs in
Brazil indicate that road users are paying for this lack of capacity and interest at the local
level in terms of roads in bad condition.
While Indonesia is not as good a performer as Brazil in terms of resource costs, it
is better with respect to preference costs.  The superior performance of Indonesia with
respect to preference costs relative to Brazil and the Philippines may be attributed to
centralization of fiscal authority which has traditionally been fostered with the argument
that it preserves national unity and promotes efficiency.  Works on road construction are
funded entirely by the central government through grants and shared revenues.  In
addition, the central government is heavily involved in planning, and implementation of
road construction programs.  Central government's interference in road construction
activities has been questioned by many in practice, however, our analysis suggests that
these criticisms may not have foundation, when looking at countries with similar levels of
decentralization.  The criticism holds, however, when compared to countries at different
levels of decentralization where it appears that the benefits that the central government
can attain in economies of scale in production of roads are not as high as those due to
increased efficiency with decentralized provision as in the case of Argentina.
The Philippines produce road services at a lower level of efficiency than expected
at [0-10] percent decentralization. Resource costs are as low as in Argentina (after
normalizing by per capita GNP), implying low unit costs of construction, but preference
costs are higher than Indonesia also at [0-  1O] degrees of decentralization and Argentina at
a much higher level of decentralization.  In the Philippines, the central government
finances road construction operations from general grants, maintaining tight control over
14expenditures while taking advantage of economies of scale in conducting construction
works. These results give credence to the argument that they are differing levels of effort,
at the same level of decentralization, to reduce resource and preference costs.
Argentina is more efficient than Colombia even after normalizing by per capita
GNP.  Colombia's seemingly worse performance is surprising, especially considering its
unique "contract" approach towards decentralization, which accommodates flexibly local
conditions and diversity of implementing and financing of construction works. Road
construction in Colombia is the functional responsibility of departments although most of
the financing comes from the national budget. But just how construction works are
financed and carried out varies from department to department, perhaps resulting in a loss
in economies of scale as evidenced by the poorer performance compared to Argentina.
Each area can make specific arrangements with accordance to their financial and
institutional capacity and interests. In the coffee-growing region, for example, the quasi-
public Federation of Coffee Growers plays an important role in shaping and financing
rural development policy in terms of building roads and making infrastructure
investments (Bird, 1995). In some of the oil-producing regions, the state oil company,
Ecopetrol, plays a similar role in helping municipalities put their royalty income  towards
construction activities.  In some of the better-run departments, such as Antioquita and
Valle, the departmental government itself takes on the major responsibility for
construction activities.  In others, some of the coastal provinces, the regional offices of
national agencies play a more important role. There seems to be much lower level of
effort in Colombia than in Argentina and Indonesia, as there is a wider gap between
resource and preference costs than in the comparator countries.  It may be that since most
of the financing still comes from the national budget that functional and fiscal
responsibilities are not well aligned.
At [50-691  percent decentralization, Germany's performance deviates the most
from the other seven countries in terms of non-normalized costs  in the performance
ranking (see table 1). However, at the comparable level of decentralization after
normalizing for technological differences, it performs better than Argentina and
Colombia.  Its road condition is very good but interestingly enough satisfaction of
preferences is achieved at high unit costs. This outcome reflects a unique feature of
German governmental objectives, the traditional tradeoff between the guarantee of
autonomy and efficiency versus the objective of safeguarding the unity of living
conditions throughout the German territory.  In the road sector, the federal government
provides a degree of uniformity of living conditions by requiring uniform road condition
standards in the country.  This is mainly achieved through  federal government transfer of
funds (GFVG funds), ear-marked specifically towards construction activities.  However,
since these funds are fixed and their allocation is  independent of level of performance,
local governments do not have any incentive to operate cost efficiently. To reduce unit
costs of construction, the government could consider untying the GFVG funds, rendering
15them more flexible as to allow local governments to establish service levels that reflect
actual demand.16
South Africa and the US both are efficient producers at very high levels of
decentralization.  In the United States, resource costs are very high (before normalizing
for technology) but preference costs are lower than the mean level.  The responsibility for
construction works rests with counties, local governments and townships.  With the loss
of Federal funds (GRS funds), local governments are faced with major adjustments. They
have to fund construction works essentially from already limited internal revenues,
generally from shared motor fuel tax receipts and license fees from state governments,
property tax revenues and appropriations from the general fund of local governments.
Faced with these budgetary constraints, local governments seem to have improved their
delivery of road services, as the USA is well below the cross-country average in terms of
total costs of road service provision.  To reduce the high level of resource costs, local
governments should opt for cost reduction strategies, limiting construction service
programs. To improve performance,  local governments could merge into larger
jurisdictions to capture back economies of scale and reduce unit costs. With the average
township in the Midwest having only 40 miles of  road, Walzer et al (1987) emphasized
that this alternative certainly deserves attention. But a survey conducted in the Midwest
showed that nearly 63 percent of the farmers thought local governments were efficient
providers of road services (Walzer and McWilliams, 1989). They showed relatively
strong support for managing the system via the current decentralized structures. More
cooperation between townships and counties is an alternative to consolidation.
Cooperation purchases of materials, sharing of specialized equipment's,  and cooperation
in large projects are examples of the kinds of efforts that can be considered to improve
performance even further (to levels close to Germany for example).
Resource costs using the eight country experience are seen to be highly variable in
the [0-50] percent decentralization range, and they decline systematically (with the
exception of South Africa) as we move to the right from [50-100] degrees of
decentralization, as seen in figure 2(b)  This result is in line with Oates' hypothesis that
initially the central government has economies of scale in managing the financing of
construction works (perhaps as observed in more efficient centralized procurement and
supervision systems) and that greater decentralization results at the beginning in loss of
economies of scale resulting in cost increases. The observed declining of costs
corroborates Oates' contention that there may be a switch in the resource cost curve.  As
for the preference costs curve, there is evidence for a downward slope, which implies an
improvement  in the condition of roads with increasing degrees of decentralization.  But
as we move to the right on the graph road condition worsens (as in the case of Colombia)
and then improves again. Following Biehl's (1994) diversity argument, at higher levels of
decentralization, local preferences may be expressed in terms of accepting poorer road
16 A more in-depth  analysis  of Germany's  experience  with  decentralization  and its performance  in the road
sector is in section  seven.
16conditions, which may explain the upward slope in the preference costs between
Argentina and Colombia.
Of particular interest is that there is evidence for several points of inflection in the
graphs in figures 2(a) and (b): Note what the various points on the curve represent.  The
first point, where there is complete centralization, shows quite clearly the tradeoff
between resource and preference costs, with preference costs being generally high.
Although unit costs of construction can be low, as in the case of Brazil, there is a high
price to be paid in terms of roads in poor condition. However, there is a possibility of
differing levels of effort, as Brazil and Indonesia have milder differences between each
other than between them and the Philippines.  The second inflexion point represents even
higher levels of central government involvement in financing of construction works.  At
this point, somewhere between  [50-60] percent decentralization, a country like Argentina
is more efficient than a country like Colombia.  It is interesting to see that the costs to
road users as well as the cost of providing roads decrease as we move further to the right.
But clearly maximum satisfaction of local preferences can solely be achieved at a very
high cost, as in the case of Germany, which is a country trying to balance preference and
resource costs at a high level of decentralization and has resource costs much higher than
the USA which does not have this objective.  Moving further to the right, in terms of
increased degrees of decentralization represents various tradeoffs between low and high
unit costs of construction and poor or improved  road conditions.'7 South Africa [77%
decentralization] is a country which is not performing this balancing act very well, while
the USA with 97% decentralization of construction is.
Consistent with theory, our graphical analysis, suggests that when central
governments are fiscally responsible for construction activities, they may have economies
of scale due to centralized management of the  procurement and supervision of
construction activities; however, some decentralization may be desirable to improve
efficiency.  Total decentralization is not always guaranteed to result in a reduction in
resource costs, however, as it depends on the expended level of effort.  Preference costs
are the hardest to satisfy at differing levels of decentralization, with country-specific
factors playing an important role in determining the achievable performance under any
given structure of decentralization. There are however, more serious deviations in
performance at the centralized level of provision.
Decentralization of Maintenance Expenditures
In figures 3(a) and (b) we  present the results of a comparison in achievement for
the eight case study countries.  The ordinate measures the share of local government in
17The  possibility  of multiple  optima  of the resource  cost  function  in  figures  2(a)  and (b) may  be due to the
unobserved  level of effort expended  by the various  levels  of government  in construction  activities  such as
through  competitive  contracting  of works  to lower  costs. The same  holds  for figures  3(a) and  (b) and 4(a)
and (b).
17financing of maintenance operations. The abscissa measures performance in terms of the
unit cost of maintenance in $ per km and the cost of bad condition of roads to the users
also converted to $ per km. We overlay the concepts developed in section 2 in these
figures to further demonstrate this result.  A look at the two cost curves shows that there
are almost no costs to decentralization of road maintenance from the road users
perspectives for both the normalized (figure 3(b)) and non-normalized (figure 3(a)) costs.
Preference costs decrease systematically the more decentralization advances.  Resource
costs are low at complete centralization for Brazil and the Philippines, but not for
Indonesia.  Resource costs rise at high levels of decentralization (between 30 and 50%),
declining again to a value equivalent to that before decentralization. This observation
supports Musgrave's allocative efficiency argument that local governments are more
prone to tailor their budgets toward local preferences.
Taking preference and resource costs together, the total cost curve shows that the
optimal level of decentralization for maintenance lies at two regions, between 0 and 30%
and more than 80% fiscal decentralization.  At these points resource costs are at their
minimum and preference costs are declining. In the region to the right of 90% the
savings from decentralization seem to be achieved at an increasing rate, and not at the
expense of increasing preference costs (see South Africa and the USA in Table 1).
In summarizing the performance of countries in figures 3(a) and (b), we see the
following: Argentina, Brazil and Philippines all are highly centralized in financing of
their maintenance operations. The Philippines has the worst performance for this group
of countries with resource costs well the comparator countries even after normalizing by
per capita GNP.  In Brazil, performance in terms of resource costs is good after
normalizing by per capita GNP, but preference costs are higher than in Argentina,
indicating that the road users are not getting as good road quality as in Argentina for
about the same level of resource cost. To understand this outcome we need to look at
Brazil's experience with decentralization. Throughout most of the 1980s, road service
delivery and financial resources were concentrated in the hands of the central government
but in 1988, the government initiated decentralizing financing and authority.
Transferring responsibilities to municipalities and state road agencies has been a slow and
resource intensive process since appropriate capacities first had to be built at these levels
to establish adequate planning and maintenance operation systems (World Bank, 1994).
In accord with our theoretical expectations, this has led to some cost efficiencies in
Brazil, but the benefits to the users are yet to come.
The benefits of decentralized functional responsibility even in the presence of
fiscal decentralization can specifically be seen in the case of Argentina.  In Argentina,
road maintenance operations are financed centrally, whereas, the responsibility for road
maintenance works has traditionally rested with the provinces. Compared to Brazil,
Argentina's long experience with  functional decentralization has allowed more
autonomy and resources for maintaining road networks. This explains potentially why
preference costs are lower in Argentina than in Brazil, for the same level of resource
costs.
18Measuring performance in terms of resource cost efficiency, we find Brazil and
Argentina to be better than the Philippines in producing maintenance activities at the
same level of fiscal decentralization.  This may be due to the differential use of
contracting out within these countries. A World Bank review of nine different countries
found that roads under contract were well-maintained in at least seven of them (Harral
and Faiz, 1988:19).  The authors concluded that " By and large contract maintenance
leads to be more cost -effective than maintenance by other methods."  Evidence from
Ponta Grossa in Brazil indicated that force account maintenance costs 60 percent more
than that by contractors (Harral et al, 1986: 11-12). Humplick (1995) conducted an
analysis of performance for maintenance in Argentina, showing that variations in
performance may be determined by the level of competition, essentially the relative use
of force account versus the private sector. Her study shows that "Provinces that use the
private sector more substantially for maintenance works in Argentina are more efficient,
allowing a large part of the network to be maintained with a fixed budget." (Humplick,
1995).  Other experience with contracting in Latin American countries confirm
Humplick's results.  For example, Gyamfi and Ruan's review of the experience of
Argentina and Brazil with private contracting, shows that private contracting in Brazil has
brought about adequate levels of performance, and when private contracting was
completely stopped in Argentina, performance suffered substantially. Gyamfi and Ruan
(1992) note, however, that a clear government agency policy and support, the existence of
a capable local construction industry with sufficient road maintenance capacity and the
ability of road agencies to administer and manage have been important factors for the
successful adoption of private contractor systems in Brazil.'8
Moving further to the right, we see that Colombia at a decentralization category of
[11-49] allows its local governments more expenditure decision-making power in
maintenance of roads. The provision of maintenance is at a very high cost compared to
the seven other countries with the exception of Indonesia which has similar unit costs of
maintenance.  Preference costs are lower than in the Philippines which is fiscally
centralized with respect to maintenance, but are higher than all other remaining countries
in the case study. This is quite surprising because with both fiscal and functional
decentralization and ear-marking of funds, expenditure decisions should theoretically be
tied closely to maintenance operations, producing better road quality.19 Starting in 1983,
the government in Colombia introduced decentralization measures to increase local
resource mobilization.  But major expenditure authority still remains with the central
government (FNCV is mainly financed through central government contributions,
consisting of earmarked and quasi-earmarked funds).  Since 1987, Colombia has
18  The theoretical literature and practical experience with contracting is rich. For an overview of
arguments for and against contracting, see Schroeder L. (1990), Managing and Financing Rural Road
Maintenance in Developing Countries, Decentralization and Management Project, Associates in Rural
Development.
19 This is essentially the public economics argument for earmarking, for a thorough discussion, see
Mcleary, W., "Notes on the Principles and Practice of Earmarking", prepared for a seminar titled
Earmarking: Road Funds and Toll Roads, The World Bank, INUTD-PERTM, November 21-22, 1988.
19introduced also functional decentralization, granting local governments increasing
responsibility for planning and budgeting of roads. This negative outcome may reflect a
problem that many developing countries face with ear-marking of road user charges.
Especially for maintenance, Harral and Faiz (1988) find ear-marking rarely finds its way
where it is supposed to and it is used inefficiently and for purposes other than
maintenance.  But more importantly,  Colombia's poor performance may be attributed to
the fact that despite the introduction of functional decentralization, municipalities remain
weak institutionally and financially to carry out the assigned road maintenance
operations.  An alternative explanation may be that when people have the autonomy to
choose both the quality and resource expenditure levels, as in Colombia, they choose
lower  levels of quality, preferring to expend resources for other needs.  A recent World
Bank local government capacity study confirms that local governments in Colombia are,
in fact, facing difficulties in carrying out their new functions due to inadequate
administrative or technical capacities (World Bank, 1990).
Although resource costs are high, Colombia's performance in time is improving.
This is understandable when we look at Colombia's experience with production of
maintenance.  Throughout the 1  980s Colombia provided increasing opportunities to
private contractors for conducting maintenance works.  In 1984, it started the micro-
empresas initiative with UNDP's assistance and a review of Colombia's experience
indicates that the use of micro-empresas have led to reductions in unit of maintenance by
half (Gyamfi and Ruan, 1992:22). This trend is positive but better resource cost
efficiency gains can be made if more contractors would be involved.
At [50-69] percent decentralization, in Germany the responsibility for road
maintenance operations rests entirely with local governments.  Financing comes,
however, partially from the state governments government.  There is no ear-marking of
revenues for maintenance and expenditures are allocated from general local and state
government appropriations.  This means that local governments are autonomous and
quite flexible in their expenditure decision-making.  Considering local demands, they
may see spending on road maintenance as more prestigious than new construction or
spending on other services. This may explain why preference costs are far below all the
other countries in the case study, reflecting, in effect, the preference expressed for higher
levels of road service quality to meet the demand for other services.  Such high quality
levels of maintenance are achieved at a reasonable resource costs.  It seems that are more
incentives to operate efficiently with respect to maintenance than with respect to
construction in Germany, possibly because there is no earmarking of maintenance funds
and local governments finance their expenditures from state grants at their discretion.
In Indonesia, road maintenance operations are functionally and fiscally
decentralized at [70-90] percent decentralization. Although the central government's
share in financing of operations is high, local governments have real control over
maintenance delivery,  allocating expenditures independently from the central
government and also financing maintenance from own-source revenues. The
performance of Indonesia, while worse than that of Argentina and Brazil after
20normalizing by per capita GNP, is improving over time.  Accountability seems to be the
key to Indonesia's improving performance.  Studies show that roads are maintained cost
efficiently when information (on the performance of local governments) is enhanced and
when there is a sharing mechanism that makes it possible to deal with observed problems
(Bird, 1994:17).  One study showed that local governments involve beneficiaries in road
maintenance works; for example private firms maintain roads they need to get their
products to the main highway.  In other instances, well-defined groups of farmers who
clearly benefited from road improvements were similarly carrying out routine
maintenance tasks (Bird, 1994:15).  In yet another, an appropriate solution appeared to
lie in the imposition of explicit user charges since most road users were willing to pay.
These examples show that maintenance service levels reflecting beneficiaries' demand
may be established if local authorities can exercise real control over maintenance service
delivery and allocate expenditures freely.
South Africa represents a better perforner than Indonesia at even a higher level of
decentralization, with costs well below those of other countries in the case study except
for Argentina, Germany and the USA.  At very high levels of decentralization, local
governments in South Africa are not as efficient in conducting road maintenance works
and accounting for local demand for good road conditions.
Moving towards absolute decentralization, in the United States, performance is
better than all the case study countries except Germany, after normalizing by per capita
GNP.  In the United States, the responsibilities for road maintenance are both functionally
and fiscally decentralized with local governments having the jurisdiction to serve their
areas.  Our graphical analysis, directly comparing the USA to Germany, corroborates
empirical evidence that roads in the United States are not in good condition after
decentralization (Walzer and Chicoine, 1989:79). Furthermore, unlike the theoretical
expectations that preference costs increase at extreme levels of decentralization, we see
that the USA has been able to keep these costs lower than the other case study countries.
This can be understood by looking at recent trends in road financing structures in the
United States. Traditionally, intergovernmental aid (federal aid) has constituted a major
source of revenue for state and local governments. Beginning in 1987, the federal
government stopped the federal General Revenue Sharing (GRS), which was a transfer
used to finance road construction and improvements. Since then, funds for road works
are raised locally from general appropriations. These funds are not earmarked. This has
put state and local governments in a tight budgetary position, perhaps increasing their
productivity. It was predicted that the cost of bringing roads to good condition are well
beyond the current fiscal capacity of most local govermnents.  A survey conducted in
1987 indicated that bringing all roads in the system to an acceptable 20 performance level
would cost over six times the average spending per mile by governments (Walzer et al,
1987). The actual effect has been to increase efficiency, as preference costs have not
declined since 1987. A caveat is necessary at this point: some evidence suggests that
20 An acceptable  level in the eye of local governments  is below  the desired  engineering  performance
standards  but it is consistent  with local demand  for the service.
21local governments in the United states have adopted a  cost containment or cost reducing
alternative, not maintaining roads and rather bringing revenues in line with service
demand (Walzer et al, 1987:36). This response may show up in the future as higher
preference costs as the road conditions deteriorate.
What can most clearly be depicted from the graphical discussion is that as
countries become more decentralized, the level of effort to be expended on minimizing
preference and resource costs declines. Brazil and the Philippines who are highly
centralized have wider differences in performance than South Africa and the USA who
are almost totally decentralized.  Local governments in Colombia, Brazil and the
Philippines need to invest more resources in meeting demand and operating cost
efficiently, compared to Germany, South Africa and the USA.  With fiscal (partial or
total) and functional decentralization, the performance of the latter countries reflects
actual demand for maintenance service levels.  Further,  the discussion indicates that in
the presence of fiscal centralization, both functional decentralization and increased
competition can improve performance. However, there is a cost to decentralization which
is reflected in the presence of inferior service levels (see South Africa and Indonesia) than
can be achieved at more centralized levels (such as in Argentina).  The United States
presents an example where performance is maximized at very high levels of decentralized
maintenance, indicating that the dangers of decentralization are country specific.
Decentralization ofAdministration  Expenditures
Similar to the above cases, we discuss the effect of decentralization of
administration, defined as the fiscal share of local government in administrative works,
on resource costs, measured in terms of unit cost of administration and preference costs
which are the costs to users at different levels of decentralized administration.  In figures
4(a) and (b), we see that the countries that are fiscally centralized such as Brazil,
Indonesia, and the Philippines, have a wide range of performance with respect to the
efficiency of administration.  The central government seems to operate along high unit
costs of administration in Indonesia and the Philippines compared to Brazil.  This result
is consistent with the challenging argument put forward by public choice economists that
matching grants, preservation of positions and inertia can encourage governments to
operate at high marginal cost  (Hirsch (1968), Brennan and Buchanan (1980)).  Musgrave
(1959), among others, has vigorously contested this view. But what is of interest here is
support of Brennan and Buchanan's claim that decentralization is an effective mechanism
to control large central governments from spending too much.  In fact, we see that as we
move to the right, decentralization allows for decline in administrative resource costs,
with the lowest unit cost, after normalizing for per capita GNP, being in Argentina,
Germany and the USA, all three highly decentralized from an administrative point of
22view.  South Africa 2 '  and Colombia stand out with very high costs of administration at
high levels of decentralization.
It appears that costs increase rapidly initially, then decline at between 60 and 80%
decentralization.  Administrative costs increase again between 80 and 90%
decentralization of administration, after which they decline rapidly indicating that it takes
low levels of effort to satisfy the same level of preferences at higher levels of
decentralization.  Moving further towards increased degrees of decentralization, condition
of roads improve systematically, however, at the expense of increased resource costs. The
choice between centralization and decentralization, therefore depends on societal
objectives, contingent on country specific governmental and fiscal structures. The
presence of the point in which South Africa lies, suggests that there is a need for a central
government role in administration and that it is rare to achieve the kind of savings that
can be seen in the USA at high levels of decentralization. An argument supporting this
observation has been made by Parker (1995) in recognizing the separate role of political,
fiscal and functional decentralization in determining the impact on performance of a
sector.
Decentralization of Administration  and Cost Recovery
In this section we examine the impact of decentralizing administrative functions
on cost recovery and collection of road user revenues (see figure 5).  Cost recovery is
defined as the share of road user charges in total revenue. While user charges increase
with  increasing degrees of functional decentralization, maximum cost recovery is
reached when there is only a limited degree of functional decentralization.  This outcome
is in accord with economic theory, where it is argued that that the central government is
more cost efficient and in a better position to impose and collect user charges.22 The
central government has an advantage because it can impose user charges, for example, tax
on gasoline and tires, at various levels, either to the wholesale distributor or at the point
of manufacturing or even at the point of import. Local governments would have to
impose such levies at the retail level, thereby, adding greatly to administrative costs.
Similarly taxes on the sale of vehicles are probably most readily administered by the
central government since it is the central goverunent that oversees custom duties as well
as records vehicle ownership.
Looking at the experience of four countries, we see that in the United States cost
recovery  is high at [90-100] percent decentralization.  Local and state governments are
responsible for the administration and collection of these road use related revenues.  The
basic idea is that since these levels of government are entirely responsible for serving
roads in their areas, they should also have the responsibility for collection of appropriate
21  The political  conditions  that  existed  in South  Africa  at the time  this data was collected  have  an impact  on
the performance  outcomes  observed.
22 For more on this  topic, see Hyman,  1990.
23financing instruments used for that purpose. States levy taxes on motor fuels and
registration taxes, sale taxes, vehicle safety fees, transport tax and a number of other
taxes.  Similar to the USA, Argentina represents an interesting position at [50-69] degrees
of decentralized administration.  Cost recovery is quite high in Argentina with the federal
government levying all taxes on fuel revenues. In detail, the fuel revenues are made up of
a tax on registration, domestic tax on gasoline and fuel oil, and a domestic tax on all other
liquid fuels.
In Germany cost recovery is very low.  The most important of road user charges is
the value-added tax (VAT) on vehicle acquisition, whose rate is set by the federal
government.  In general state and local government taxes represent "own" revenues in so
far as they are collected within the respective territory.  This also means that the tax
collection rate is higher. VAT, however, is an instrument used by the federal government
for horizontal fiscal equalization. VAT revenues are allocated 35 percent to states and 65
percent to the federal government but local governments do not receive any funds from
the VAT revenues. This can explain lower cost recovery levels in Germany compared to
the USA and Argentina.  To address this issue, currently there is debate in Germany to
do away with the local government business tax and replace it with VAT for local
governments.
6. Case of Korea
Next we conduct a longitudinal analysis, examining  the Korean experience in
fiscal and functional decentralization of its road sector from 1968-1992.  The main idea
is to test the double cost model adapted for the fixed country effect to see whether the
Korean experience validates our results from section 5.  Similar to before,  we employ the
graphical analysis to estimate the impact of various types of decentralization on Korea's
performance in the road sector.  Korea was selected because of its rich and diverse
decentralization experience in the road sector. Table 2 shows that road financing in
Korea has been subject to various changes  from 1968-1992. Briefly, throughout the 60s
and 70s, the financing of road operations was centralized. The major breakpoint towards
decentralization of road financing took place in 1976 when local governments became
more autonomous in their expenditure decision-making.
Employing the double-cost approach, we investigate the optimal choice of
location of road provision for various types of decentralization from the Korean
experience.  Following the familiar convention, the ordinate measures various degrees
and types of fiscal decentralization and the abscissa measures performance in terms of
resource and preference costs. We start with the case of maintenance, in figure 6, where
the ordinate measures the share of local government in financing of maintenance
operations and the abscissa measures the unit cost of maintenance and the condition of
roads.  Of particular interest is that the plots of the two cost curves for Korea have the
same trend as that for the eight country panel.  In figure 6 we see that resource costs are
concave, increasing first and decreasing at later stages of decentralization. The preference
24cost curve is convex. It decreases initially and then increases at higher levels of
decentralization before it starts leveling off. The optimal level of decentralization of
maintenance for Korea can be determined by looking at the total cost curve.  Total costs
increase initially and then decrease to reach a minimum at  [50-69] percent
decentralization; this observation is very much in line with the results of our general
analysis.
As for construction,  figure 7 shows that resource costs are at their minimum
when financing is centralized. They increase at an increasing rate as decentralization
progresses, reaching a resource cost maximum at [50-69] degrees of decentralization and
declining after that.  As for the preference cost curve, consistent with the theoretical
expectations, it is downward sloping, implying that road conditions improve as
decentralization advances.  Overall, in support of the fiscal federalist argument,  the
optimal level of service provision would lie at [0-10] percent decentralization if the
objective is resource cost minimization.  But at this point preference costs are at their
maximum, indicating essentially that road quality is poor and not enough money is being
spent on road works.  Increased levels of decentralization, however, lead to betterment of
road conditions but this is achieved with increased resource costs.  The total cost curve
displays the point where total costs are minimized, namely at [70-90] degrees of
decentralization.
A  look at figure 8 suggests that administrative operations are conducted most cost
efficiently when there is [50-69] degrees of decentralization. At point A, resource costs
are low but as decentralization advances, resource costs increase at an increasing rate (see
point B).  This shows that breaking up the already existing administrative units is costly
but decentralization pays off once the units are created. See that when we move from
point B to C, we observe declining trends in resource costs; in fact, point C represents the
minimum for administrative resource costs.  Although the preference cost minimum is
reached at point B, the total cost curve shows that point C is the most preferred level of
decentralization for financing administrative operations for Korea.
The results from the longitudinal analysis in Korea give a better understanding of
the optimal ranges of decentralization for the road sector. We find that the position
attained by Germany and the USA in the analysis in section 5, is corroborated in the case
of Korea which has had switches in its degree of fiscal decentralization in the road sector.
7. Case of Germany
Germany is the second detailed case study for the measure of the impact of
decentralization on road performance. Germany has been selected for two reasons: First,
it has a  highly decentralized government structure with state and local governments
bearing full autonomy over road expenditures. Second, the combination of a horizontal
and vertical financing structure raise some interesting issues with regard to the
performance of state and local governments in the infrastructure sector.  Table 3 gives a
25summary of the degree of decentralization and performance of the road sector in various
states in Germany.
In general, the German Federal system before the unification comprised a federal
government, 11 states, among them 3 city states, and 328 districts and roughly 8500 local
governments.  Local governments as organizations of self government are part of state
governments.  But the constitution guarantees local self government within the
framework of laws.  Local governments have a general authority to deal with all matters
of local concern in the framework of the constitution, and the federal and state laws; the
federal government has some explicitly stated exclusive competencies and can enter the
field of local governments when uniform solutions are required for the entire German
territory.  The German government system has been described as cooperative federalism
or "unitary federal state" where the principles of optimal differentiation of responsibilities
are realized with a tendency towards cooperation and coordination.
The distribution of expenditure authorities between the federal, state and local
governments is in line with this principle of optimal differentiation of responsibilities
and a pronounced preference for cooperation. State governments decide on their own on
the level of expenditures for different road work activities.  Similarly, local governments
determine how much to spend on their respective roads.  State governments are
responsible for construction, maintenance and administration of state roads, whereas,
local governments are in charge of all district and municipal roads.  It shall be mentioned
that local governments  assume also responsibility for portions of state roads on behalf of
state governments. 23
The fiscal structure in Germany provides the framework for cooperative
arrangements. Although state and local governments finance major parts of their
expenditures on road works from own-source revenues, the intergovernmental grant
system serves as an instrument of equalization and harmonization of living conditions.  In
general, state governments dispose of yields from the tax on beer, wealth tax and motor
vehicle tax and generally finance expenditures on local services from these sources.
Local governments derive their revenue from the property tax and the local business tax
and from taxes on consumption and excise taxes and use charges and credits.  These
constitute approximately two-thirds of local government revenues. The remaining is
financed from state and federal government grants and transfers.  As mentioned, grants
are used both between the federal and state governments and between the state and local
governments as instruments of vertical fiscal equalization. They are often times of  a
general untied nature and based on weights derived from the number of inhabitants, but
some are for specific purposes. One such grant is the GVFG provided by the federal
government through the state government to local governments for constructing road
23 There are 237 districts in Germany in charge of 67,285 km of district roads and 296,737 km of municipal
roads under the responsibility of municipalities. Districts also take charge of municipal roads on a
voluntary basis. These add up to 364,022 km of local governmnent  roads, almost three times the length of
state roads (65713 km) and federal roads (39633 km) taken together.
26works. 24 Local governments also receive grants (FAG funds) from state governments to
conduct maintenance works.25  These transfers represent instruments that have been
criticized because of their "good merit" or "golden bridle" character where the granting
government can attach strings to such funds such that the receiving government is no
longer free to use them according to its own preferences. We will look at the implications
for the road sector in the next section.
Vertical Analysis
The graphical analysis at the vertical level aims at discussing the road
performance of state- versus local governments.  For construction, figure 9 shows that
resource costs decline systematically with increased decentralization at the state
government level.  At the local government level, resource costs increase initially and
then decrease at higher levels of decentralization. Looking at the two curves
simultaneously, recognizing that an increase in decentralization at the state level means
more responsibility for the local governments, we may be witnessing a "passing-on-of-
the-costs" of road provision to lower levels of governments in the early stages of
decentralization. The increased autonomy at the local level may then lead to increased
efficiency at higher levels of decentralization; hence explaining the difference in the
shape of the gains between local and state governments.  State governments seem to have
economies of scale in production of roads--better technology and equipment to conduct
the works--which local governments do not inherit when decentralization takes place.
Considering the financing side, we had observed in section 5 that Germany has very high
unit costs of construction, even after normalizing by per capita GNP.  The local
government financing structure for construction activities can help explain this effect.
Local governments receive ear-marked transfers from the federal government (GVFG
transfers) to construct road works.  These transfers are only allocated for very large
construction projects and cover on average between 50-80 percent of the costs.26 Tied
grants of this sort provide less incentives for governments to operate efficiently.
As for maintenance activities, at lower levels of decentralization, local
governments are better performers than state governments (see figure 10).  But unit cost
of maintenance at the local government level increase in a linear fashion as
decentralization advances, whereas, at the state government level, resource costs decrease
24  Two related  arguments  are put forward  for provision  of federal  government  grants:  a) the overall
importance  of roads  in economic  development  of the German  territory;  and b) the positive  externalities
resulting  from such transfers. The GVFG  transfer  covers  on average  50-80  % of the construction  costs
and can only  be requested  for construction  projects  larger  than 200,000  DM.
25  The allocation  formula  varies  from state to state:  in Baden-Wuerttemberg,  for example  the FAG transfer
is 13,800 DM for 1.  km/'000  population; 17,300 DM for 2 km/'000  pop. and 20,700 DM for 3 km/'000
pop. . In Bavaria, it is lower at 3000 DM/'000 pop for 1. km and 6,700 for 2. km/'000  pop. and 9,200 DM
for 3. km/'000  pop. In Schleswig-Holstein, it a fixed amount of 5500 DM per km.  In all other states, FAG
transfers are allocated as share of total amount of transfers to local governments.
Information from Jung, Dieter, Direktor beim Landekreisverband Bayern, Muenchen.
27with increased decentralization.  This result is consistent with the "passing-on-of-the-
cost" observation made in the case of construction; only it is more apparent.  The proper
level of decentralization for local governments seems to lie at [40-65] percent
decentralization.  At the state government level, resource cost minimum is reached at [76-
100] percent decentralization.  This indicates that state governments operate more cost
efficiently when local governments have more responsibility, whereas, local governments
are less cost efficient with increased transferred responsibilities.
We can conduct a comparative study of performance for the seven states by
simply overlaying the state and local government specific data obtained from the sample.
We obtain two plots for each state, one reflecting the performance of the state and the
other performance of various local govermnents in that state.  For maintenance, figure 10
shows that six out of seven states behave similarly in their performance.
Schleswigholstein, Rheinlandwestfalen, Saarland, Baden-wuerttemberg, Bayern and
Hessen are all excellent performers with resource costs at local- and state government
levels being well below the average resource costs.  Further, the gap between local and
state government performance in these states is very small.  This result reflects the typical
attribute of a cooperative federalism where there is emphasis on coordination among the
state governments.  Coordination is fostered through so-called "Gremiums" or "vertical
fraternities" whose mandate is to develop guidelines and periodically review the criteria
for provision of grants to local govermments  and to discuss issues regarding
harmonization of conditions relating to roads at the local government levels. These
Gremia are very useful since they reduce the involvement of the federal government but
still act as national coordinators in the representation of road users.
Further cooperation is fostered through contracting out.  States contract out
maintenance works to local governments, who are closer to the road users and more
efficient deliverers of maintenance works both on state and local roads.  But coordination
seems more feasible at lower levels of decentralization. This can be seen in the example
of  Nordrheinwestfalen, where there is a large gap in performance of  state and local
governments.  High levels of decentralization seem to lead to cost inefficiencies.
As for construction, figure 9 shows that six out of seven states are highly
decentralized in their construction activities.  Saarland can be categorized as one of the
good performers.  At [66-75] degrees of decentralization, unit cost of road construction in
Saarland is well below the average level of performance. Moving further towards
increased decentralization, we see that local governments in Schleswigholstein perform
even better. Resource costs are lowest for local governments in this state. In all other
states, both state and local government performance is poorer than average (see Bayern,
Badenwuerttemberg, Hessen and Nordrheinwestfalen). This result is quite interesting,
especially since the latter are the richer states in Germany.  To understand these results,
we would need to conduct a more in-depth study of the construction sector in these states.
Horizontal Analysis
28The horizontal analysis is a discussion of  resource cost efficiency at the local
government level for different types of roads.  Again, the measure of decentralization at
this level is different in that the number of  local governments per capita GDP serves as
an indicator of spatial decentralization and measures the depth of decentralization.  Local
governments are responsible for three types of roads. Districts maintain, construct and
administer district roads.  Municipalities are in charge of all road activities on municipal
roads.  Further, districts and municipalities assume some responsibility for state and
federal roads.  Since there is no data available on local government expenditure for
municipal roads, this section focuses on district and state road activities.
For construction, figure 11 indicates decreasing unit costs for  both types of roads
with increasing depth of decentralization.  Resource costs for district roads decrease in a
linear fashion, whereas, for state roads, the decline is non-linear.  Rheinland-pfalz is the
best performer at the highest level of decentralization. In that state, unit cost of
construction for both types of roads are equal.  This reflects the fact that as there are more
local governments, there is potential for more competitive bidding leading to more
efficient road production activities.  We see also that at lower levels of decentralization,
Baden-Wuerttemberg performs better than Bayern. This is certainly due to the increased
use of contracting out in Baden-Wuerttemberg. The Bavarian local governments possess
standing fleets of vehicles and equipment that conduct regularly works on district and
state roads. There is  a high cost associated with this strategy. In contrast, in Baden-
Wuerttemberg, states and local governments use contractors to conduct road works.
For maintenance, as can be seen in figure 12, resource costs decline initially with
increasing decentralization for district roads but they increase after [11-20] degrees of
decentralization.  This is not true for state roads, where resource cost efficiency gains are
made as decentralization advances. Local governments operate as delegated agents on
behalf of state governments and since local governments have to report to state
governments about their performance, there are more incentives to operate cost
efficiently.  We see that Rheinlandland-Pfalz is a poor performer at the highest degree of
spatial decentralization. In contrast, Hessen and Schleswigholstein perform better with
less spatial decentralization.
8.  Summary and Policy Conclusions
The analysis of the experience in decentralization of road provision activities in a
panel of eight countries, a longitudinal analysis over 25 years of change in Korea, and a
vertical and horizontal analysis across states and local governments in Germany resulted
in remarkably similar conclusions which are summarized in this section. We found that
the impact of decentralization varies depending on which aspect one is considering:
effiency of producing road services or the impact on road users. Resource costs--the
costs of providing roads in $ per km--are concave, increasing first and decreasing at later
29stages of decentralization.  Preference costs--the costs to road users as a result of bad
roads--consistent with theoretical expectations are downward sloping, implying that road
conditions improve as decentralization advances.  The implication of this finding is that
there are initial costs to decentralization, most of which seem to be in the form of losses
in economies of scale.  However, there is empirical evidence that these losses can be
outweighed by increases in efficiency that come about when the locus of provision is
closer to the people.
The advantages or limitations of decentralization are function specific, resulting in
different optima for the level of decentralization of road functions.  Cross-country and
longitudinal analysis suggest the following general ranges of optimal decentralization: (a)
maintenance functions are best provided at the local government level, with the optimal
range being more than 40 but less than 70 percent fiscal responsibility at the local level,
when the optimization involves minimizing both resource and preference costs.  When
one is considering only resource cost efficiencies, then the optimal level is complete
decentralization.  The upper bound of about 70 percent in the former case may be due to
the increased diversity of choices at higher levels of decentralization and the added
difficulty of managing multiple preferences, but it may also be due to a loss in equity
across jurisdictions (as in the case of South Africa); (b) if the objective is resource cost
minimization, as in the fiscal federalist arguments, then the optimal level for construction
functions is either completely centralized or completely decentralized. The efficiency of
construction activities is more sensitive to the degree of competition in the awarding of
contracts than to the level of decentralization; and (c) administrative activities are more
efficiently provided at decentralized levels similar to those for maintenance.  There is
supporting evidence that at early stages of decentralization it is more costly to administer
a growing number of road agents, making the optimal level more than 50 percent but less
than 80 percent fiscal responsibility at the local level.
There are a number of exceptions to these general results.  The USA is a case in
point; highly decentralized in all road functions and operating efficiently.  In fact there is
evidence that when decentralization was deepened, the level of cost efficiency improved
even further (Walzer et al, 1989). This result supports the classical fiscal federalism
argument that local governments are closer to the point of demand and are, therefore,
more efficient providers of road services. Similarly, consistent with public choice theory,
decentralization of administrative functions is considered  desirable because it leads to
larger efficiency gains in terms of resource cost savings. For all three road functions, but
especially for construction, the analysis results suggest two solution points: fiscal
centralization or complete decentralization. Economies of scale and technological effects
make the central government a good provider of road construction services (in terms of
financing and not necessarily producing the works through force account), while ability
to match supply to demand makes decentralized units more efficient. These results
indicate that there are definite benefits to decentralization for activities that are more
localized in nature such as road maintenance, and lesser benefits from decentralized
construction and administration of roads which do have the potential for large
externalities.
30The country studies also show, however, that the choice of which activities to
decentralize depends on country specific situations. The local environment differs in
many ways; historically, economically, politically, culturally, affecting the achievable
level of efficiency with decentralization. Nonetheless, there are certain lessons to be
learned depending on the type and degree of decentralization as was summarized above.
In particular, we find that performance at various levels of decentralization depends on
the structure of allocation of fiscal and functional responsibilities, essentially what we
may refer to as the "incentive structure" needed for the govermnent unit to conduct the
assigned work efficiently.  Where the central government controls all the details of
construction and maintenance works, tight or "over-control" is perhaps the desired
option, if it can be implemented.  The central government has economies of scale in
production of roads and should do the planning and budgeting, and in poorer countries
managing the hiring of labor and machinery. Fragmentation of the central government or
what may be referred to as "under-control" of major activities may initially result in cost
inefficiencies and poor conditions (see for example the experience of Indonesia).  But
once decentralization is under way, recognition of local realities, circumstances and local
diversity is quite important. This is particularly crucial for construction, which is
technology and resource intensive and also has the potential for serious externalities.
Performance depends to a large extent on the degree to which the diversity and
heterogeneity of the local government universe are recognized, essentially how far local
governments are allowed to come up with their own set of responses to financing and
conducting construction works.
The Colombian experience with decentralization may be mentioned again.  The
decentralization reform in Colombia has allowed local governments and municipalities to
have greater decision-making powers with regard to planning, selection and budgeting of
road projects and greater expenditure authority.  Depending on the region, different
government entities are responsible for conducting construction works and also financing
of road projects varies.  In oil-rich regions, royalties have constituted an important source
of revenue for construction of roads. In fact, a World bank study shows that close to 300
municipios had their investment projects financed through royalties.  In 1987 and 1988,
15 municipios receiving royalties spent 39 percent of the income on water and sewerage
projects, 24 percent on roads and the rest on other services (World Bank, 1989:5). This
fact supports the contention that when local authorities have expenditure as well as
functional responsibility, they may set priorities in sectors other than roads and choose
the appropriate level of road quality for their constituencies. In the coffee-growing
region, for example, the quasi-public Federation of Coffee Growers plays an important
role in shaping and financing rural development policy in terms of building roads and
making infrastructure investments.
The importance of aligning fiscal responsibilities to functional ones is
underscored for the case of road maintenance, a finding that supports the "souffle
31theory" 27 postulated by Parker (1995). The analysis shows that maintenance is clearly
best provided under decentralized structures. Resource cost efficiency and demand for
maintenance service levels are best reflected when both functions and the expenditure
decision-making are decentralized. However, preference costs can be minimized if those
charged with provision of maintenance works are held accountable both to those who pay
for them and to those who benefit from them.  Enforcing accountability at the local level
is not always easy.  It requires not only clear incentives but also the provision of adequate
information to local constituents as well as the exercise of real influence or control over
the service delivery system (essentially true functional decentralization). Under
centralized production of maintenance, cost efficiency depends in effect on the method of
production. Traditionally, central governments have attempted to carry out the bulk of
maintenance tasks directly, commonly through force account. But evidence suggests that
under force account there are few built-in incentives for efficiency production.
Contracting for maintenance is an alternative that has proven particularly successful in
minimizing resource costs.  In fact, it has been shown that when services are locally
provided, the use of contracting out is more frequent (Lopez-de-Silanes et al, 1995).
A number of examples in developing countries show that the existence of
competition can make a real difference. Real efficiency gains can be made when
contractors are allowed to implement the actual maintenance works, leaving the central
government agency to focus exclusively on planning and monitoring maintenance.
Likewise, private contractors may have greater flexibility in responding to seasonal
fluctuations in the demand for maintenance than the central government.  Harral and Faiz
(1988)  note, as well, that where maintenance has been a largely ignored activity,
contractors can form an effective lobby for increased or continued funding of routine
maintenance activities.  But it is important to bear in mind that efficiency gains from
contracting will occur only if there is adequate supply of contractors and real competition
among those vying for the right to conduct the maintenance activity. In some cases, such
as the experience of France in contracting out, it is evident that at the central government
level collusion is not as problematic as at the local level.
There is some evidence that services are decentralized to pass on the costs of
provision to local governments.  The case study in Germany showed that while state
governments benefitted from increased levels of decentralization in terms of lower unit
costs of providing roads, local governments initially picked up (at low levels of
decentralization) the difference in cost since they showed, at the same time, higher unit
costs.  This transfer of costly functions does have a long term benefit; at high levels of
decentralization both state and local governments show low unit costs indicating that
there may be efficiency gains at higher levels of decentralization that override the initial
increase in costs.
27 Parker suggests a "souffle" theory of decentralization that incorporates the essential elements of political,
fiscal, and institutional decentralization as they relate to rural development.  He argues that a successful
program of decentralization must include just the right combination of political, fiscal, and institutional
elements to improve rural development outcomes.
32Finally, in the countries studied, ear-marking of intergovernmental transfers
characterized much of fiscal decentralization: this feature was found in  Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Germany, and the Philippines. Whether ear-marking improves performance or
not is not quite clear.  Consistent with evidence, we find revenues ear-marked in
developing countries more often disappear probably because they are connected in ways
that are not actually desirable locally. In Germany, ear-marking has proven useful for
keeping uniform road quality standards across the country but it has also brought about
large cost inefficiencies.  Whether ear-marking accompanied with fiscal decentralization
is desirable or not depends again on the specific country objectives. In Germany we see
that the equity objective overrides the efficiency objective.
This paper has provided empirical evidence and guidance in the selection of
optimal structures for providing road services. A companion paper examines the same
issues econometrically with a larger data set (cross-country panel, time series, and state
and local data) and qualifies some of the findings in this paper (see Humplick and Moini-
Araghi, 1996).
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36Table  2: Korea  Decentralization  in the Road Sector
YEAR  Condition  Degree  of  Per capita
Roads not paved  Decentralization  GNP
(%)  (%)  Constant S 1987
1968  93.7  0  2388
1969  92  0  2404
1970  91  2  2446
1971  85.8  0  2642
1972  82.9  22  2376
1973  82.1  0  2726
1974  80.4  0  2636
1975  77.7  0  2532
1976  76  46.4  2582
1977  73.5  53.1  2628
1978  70.5  71.3  2870
1979  69.2  57.6  3178
1980  66.8  67.3  3691
1981  65.9  57.5  2921
1982  64.3  53.5  2355
1983  61  67.3  2401
1984  53.7  77.6  2492
1985  50.2  63.3  2474
1986  45.8  47.2  2746
1987  39.7  54.2  3230
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1990  28.5  55.7  4682
1991  23.6  50.4  4919
1992  19.2  48.7  5012
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